

## Message Text

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SS-15 ICA-11 TRSE-00 OMB-01 EB-08 AID-05 /113 W  
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R 080654Z APR 78  
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7025  
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY BANGUI  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
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AMEMBASSY SANA  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
CINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 KHARTOUM 1564

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGSC PGOV, PINT, PEPR, EFIN, SU  
SUBJ: SITUATION IN SUDAN - JAN-MARCH 1978

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REF: KHARTOUM 298

SUMMARY: DURING FIRST QUARTER OF 1978 SUDAN HELD FIRST  
ELECTIONS FOR THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL ASSEMBLIES SINCE  
AMNESTY-RECONCILIATION PROGRAMS BROUGHT OPPOSITION  
POLITICIANS BACK FROM EXILE OR PRISON. DESPITE ONE-  
PARTY SYSTEM, FAIRLY DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS RESULTED IN MORE

ACTIVIST, ANTI-REGIME ASSEMBLY WHICH IS, HOWEVER, STILL CONTROLLED BY LEADERSHIP SELECTED BY NIMEIRI. SADIQ AL-MAHDI WAS TALKED INTO UNEASY AND BICKERING COLLABORATION WITH NIMEIRI WHO TURNED OUT TO HAVE RETAINED REAL CONTROL OF SUDANGOV AFTER ALL; MOSELM BROTHER HASSAN TURABI ACCEPTED RECONCILIATION WITH CYNICAL TOLERANCE AND EVEN HUSSEIN AL-HINDI IN LONDON, VACILLATING BETWEEN AMNESTY AND NEW PLOTS, WAS RUMORED TO BE READY TO RETURN FROM EXILE. IN SOUTHERN REGION, ELECTIONS BROUGHT EX-REBELS AND FORMER EXILES LED BY JOSEPH LAGU INTO COMPLETE CONTROL OF REGIONAL GOVERNMENT. NEW SOUTHERN ADMINISTRATION GAVE APPEARANCE OF FRESH, VIGOROUS ATTENTION TO SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES OF REGION. NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, HEADED BY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS TROUBLE, DID NOT RECEIVE EXPECTED RELIEF FROM IMF AND ARAB COUNTRIES BECAUSE NIMEIRI CONTINUED TO HESITATE ON REFORMS, BUT INCREASING DIFFICULTIES, INCLUDING RECENT SERIOUS LABOR UNREST, MADE SOME ACTION INEVITABLE SOON. NIMEIRI'S POWER BASE IN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT REMAINED SECURE. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, SUDAN SOUGHT BETTER RELATIONS WITH LIBYA, RATHER SUCCESSFULLY AND WITH ETHIOPIA, WITHOUT MUCH SUCCESS. TIES WITH EGYPT REMAINED STRONG DESPITE DIVERGENCE OF OUTLOOK ON SHARED PROBLEMS SUCH AS LIBYA AND CHAD. NIMEIRI REMAINED SOLE SOURCE OF POLICY BUT HAS TOLERATED SO FAR PERSONAL RIVALRY BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER RASHID AL-TAHIR AND VICE PRESIDENT ABUL GASSIM. NIMEIRI CONTINUED SUDAN'S MODERATE, PRO-WESTERN STANCE ON MOST ISSUES.

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RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. PROGRESSED SMOOTHLY, AIDED BY THE ARRIVAL OF THREE OF SIX URGENTLY NEEDED C-130S AND MOVEMENT IN AID PROGRAM.

#### I. DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

1. NATIONAL RECONCILIATION MAKE A LEAP FORWARD IN FEBRUARY WHEN NATIONAL AND SOUTHERN REGIONAL ELECTIONS WERE HELD UNDER MOST LIBERAL RULES SINCE NIMEIRI TOOK POWER IN 1969. PARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS FOR NATIONAL PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY WAS ENTHUSIASTICALLY JOINED BY POLITICAL OPPOSITION RETURNED FROM EXILE OR PRISON VIA AMNESTY ACT OF AUGUST 1977. SUDAN SOCIALIST UNION, SOLE LEGAL POLITICAL PARTY, SUPERVISED ELECTION PROCESS, APPROVED ALL CANDIDATES, MONITORED CAMPAIGN SPEECHES AND COUNTED VOTES. CANDIDATES WERE FORBIDDEN TO CITE POLITICAL, ETHNIC, SECTARIAN, TRIBAL OR OTHER DIVISIVE REFERENCES NOR COULD THEY MAKE PERSONAL REMARKS ABOUT OPPONENTS, CANDIDATES WERE RESTRICTED TO SELF-PRAISE AND TO SUPPORT FOR NIMEIRI'S MAY REVOLUTION, SIX-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN AND NATIONAL UNITY. THESE GUIDELINES WERE FUTILE BECAUSE MOST CANDIDATES COULD CLARIFY THEIR POSITION WITHOUT VIOLATING LETTER OF LAW. MOSLEM

BROTHERHOOD, FOR EXAMPLE, QUOTED NIMEIRI ON NECESSITY FOR  
FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAM IN SUDAN. IN ADDITION, MANY  
CANDIDATES WERE FORMER POLITICIANS, WEALTHY OR SOCIALLY  
PROMINENT PEOPLE SUCH AS TRIBAL CHIEFS WITH EXISTING  
REPUTATIONS. IN SUM, ELECTION WAS PROBABLY MORE DEMO-  
CRATIC THAN PLANNERS INTENDED. SUDANGOV TOLERATED THIS  
FREEDOM AND ELECTION WAS PEACEFUL AND ORDERLY.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 KHARTOUM 1564

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

2. NEWLY ELECTED NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AMONG ITS MEMBERSHIP  
HAS STRONG ANTI-REGIME OPPOSITION INCLUDING SEVERAL MEMBERS

SENTENCED TO DEATH AT THIS TIME LAST YEAR. EXACT STRENGTH  
OF OPPOSITION PROBABLY VARIES FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE.  
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NIMEIRI USED PREROGATIVE OF 30 DIRECT APPOINTMENTS TO  
INSTALL LOYAL SSU VETERANS, INCLUDING FORMER SPEAKER,  
DEPUTY SPEAKER, COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN IN FORMER POSITIONS OF  
LEADERSHIP, THUS ALSO ENSURING HIMSELF WORKING MAJORITY  
ON MOST ISSUES. MEMBERS OF NEW ASSEMBLY HAVE ALREADY  
DEMONSTRATED WILLINGNESS PUBLICLY TO CRITICIZE STATE  
SECURITY ACT, LACK OF DEMOCRACY, INFLATION AND OTHER  
SENSITIVE ISSUES BUT IN GENERAL NEW ASSEMBLY IS NOT EXPECTED  
TO POSE REAL THREAT TO NIMEIRI LEADERSHIP.

3. ON RECONCILIATION AND NATIONAL UNITY, SADIQ AL-MAHDI  
AND OTHER RETURNED EXILES DISCOVERED THAT ACCESS TO  
NIMEIRI AND SUCCESSFUL PARTICIPATION IN ELECTION CAMPAIGN  
DID NOT BRING SHARE IN DECISION-MAKING OR TRUE INFLUENCE  
ON SUDAN GOVERNMENT THEY EXPECTED. HASSAN AL-TURABI,  
CHIEF OF MOSLEM BROTHERHOOD, SOLIDIFIED GRIP ON UNIVERSITY  
OF KHARTOUM AND PICKED UP PERHAS 30 SUPPORTERS IN ASSEMBLY  
BUT ACCEPTED RELATIVE WEAKNESS IN SUDANGOV WITH CYNICAL  
PATIENCE. SADIQ AL-MAHDI, ON OTHER HAND, WAS UPSET TO  
FIND NIMEIRI RETAINING WHIP HAND IN DISREGARD OF SADIQ'S  
SELF-IMAGE AS NATIONAL LEADER BY, FOR EXAMPLE, USING  
ONLY FOUR OF 27 PERSONS RECOMMENDED BY SADIQ FOR DIRECT  
APPOINTMENT TO ASSEMBLY. NIMEIRI MET PRIVATELY WITH SADIQ  
ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS TO SOOTHE RUFFLED FEATHERS. PRESENT  
WORKING ARRANGEMENT PERMITS NIMEIRI TO ENROLL SADIQ AS  
MEMBER OF SSU POLITBURO AND TO CLAIM SUCCESS FOR RECONCILIATION,  
WHILE SADIQ IN TURN WILL IGNORE SSU RESPONSIBILITIES AND  
SPEND HIS TIME FENCE-MENDING WITH MAHDIST SECT, WHICH  
REMAINS DIVIDED OVER WISDOM OF RECONCILIATION WITH  
NIMEIRI. HANDFUL OF RETURNEES HAVE REJECTED RECONCILIATION  
AND AMNESTY, PRESUMABLY ON PRINCIPLE. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER,  
SUDANGOV HAS BEEN SINCERE IN VOIDING CRIMINAL CHARGES, RESTORING  
PROPERTY TO SOME EXTENT, AND FORGETTING OLD QUARRELS.  
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SHARIF HUSSEIN AL-HINDI, FORMER NATIONAL UNION PARTY (NUP)  
LEADER AND LAST OF PROMINENT HOLD-OUTS, VACILLATED BACK AND  
FORTH BETWEEN RECONCILIATION AND RENEWED SUBVERSION ATTEMPTS  
BUT IS NOW NEGOTIATING WITH NIMEIRI FOR RETURN TO SUDAN.

4. IN SOUTHERN REGION, EX-REBELS AND AMNESTIED POLITICIANS  
WON SWEEPING VICTORY TO ENLARGED REGIONAL ASSEMBLY AT

EXPENSE OF INCUMBENT GOVERNMENT OF ABEL ALIER. LANDSLIDE WAS BASED ON ACCUSATIONS THAT ABEL ALIER ADMINISTRATION WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN IMPROVING SOUTH BECAUSE OF LACK OF INFLUENCE IN KHARTOUM AND LACK OF COMPETENCE. NEW SOUTHERN GOVERNMENT WAS FORMED UNDER GENERAL JOSEPH LAGU, FORMER COMMANDER OF REBEL ARMY WHO, SINCE PEACE IN 1972, COMMANDED SUDANESE FIRST DIVISION BASED IN SOUTH. LAGU RESIGNED FROM ARMY TO BECOME PRESIDENT OF HIGHER EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF SOUTH, NOMINATED BY SSU PARTY CAUCUS AFTER NIMEIRI SENT VICE PRESIDENT ABUL GASSIN TO JUBA TO PERSUADE ABEL ALIER NOT TO RUN. NEW ADMINISTRATION OF LAGU'S STARTED WITH FLURRY OF ACTIVITY, CHANGING ALL DISTRICT COMMISSIONERS, RETIRING SENIOR POLICE AND PRISON OFFICERS, AND ESTABLISHING AGENCIES TO SOLVE CHRONIC SERVICE PROBLEMS OF REGION. NEW REGIME APPEARS TO BE MORE AGGRESSIVE ABOUT SOUTHERN DEVELOPMENT, BUT EQUALLY INTENT ON WORKING WITHIN NATIONAL UNITY TO OBTAIN MAXIMUM DEVELOPMENT HELP FROM KHARTOUM. IN MEANTIME, ECONOMY AND GENERAL STANDARD OF LIVING IN SOUTHERN REGION APPEARED TO HAVE HIT BOTTOM AS CIVIL SERVICE PAYROLLS WERE MISSED IN JANUARY AND FEBRUARY AND JUBA WENT WITHOUT POWER, WATER AND PETROL THROUGH MARCH. KHARTOUM PRESS REPORTED ACTIONS BY REGIONAL AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TO CORRECT DEFICIENCIES.

5. ECONOMY, STILL MAJOR CONCERN OF SUDANGOV, CONTINUED TO SLIDE DOWNHILL. NEW YEAR BEGAN WITH RUMORS OF PROMISES OF IMMEDIATE HELP FROM IMF AND ARAB COUNTRIES FOR SERIOUS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEMS AND CONCOMITANT LOCAL ECONOMIC WOES SUCH AS SHORTAGES AND INFLATION. EXPECTED IMF HELP  
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IS LINKED WITH REFORMS, ESPECIALLY EXTERNAL DEVALUATION OR ITS EQUIVALENT AND REDUCTION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES. WHATEVER CAUSE, IMF HAS NOT YET COME TO RESCUE AND ARAB COUNTRIES REPORTEDLY AWAIT IMF ACTION BEFORE MAKING CONTRIBUTIONS. DEVALUATION IS SENSITIVE POLITICAL ISSUE WHICH NIMEIRI FEARS, BUT IN LATE MARCH HE APPARENTLY BEGAN PREPARATORY MANEUVERS TO PREPARE PEOPLE FOR IT AND TO SHIELD HIS LEADERSHIP FROM CRITICISM. HE APPOINTED NEW MINISTER OF FINANCE IN MARCH AND RELINQUISHED PORTFOLIO HIMSELF. HE ALSO GRUMBLED TO AMBASSADOR ABOUT DIFFICULT TERMS OF IMF ASSISTANCE IN CONTEXT WHICH SUGGESTED HE IS GIVING SERIOUS THOUGHT TO COMPLIANCE.

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SS-15 ICA-11 TRSE-00 OMB-01 EB-08 AID-05 /113 W

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R 080654Z APR 78

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 1564 SECTION 3 OF 4

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

6. REDUCTION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IS EQUALLY HARD TO  
ACCEPT AS LABOR UNREST BEGAN TO SURFACE IN LATE FEBRUARY  
AND EARLY MARCH. TRADE AND PROFESSIONAL UNIONS SPOKE OF  
STRIKE ACTION TO OBTAIN HIGHER WAGES AND URGENT NEGOTIATIONS  
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WERE CHAIRED BY VICE PRESIDENT ABUL GASSIM. THREATENED  
DOCTORS STRIKE ON MARCH 14 AND TEACHERS STRIKE SOMEWHAT  
LATER NEVER OCCURRED, BUT TECHNICIANS BEGAN SLOW-DOWN  
WORK-TO-RULES STRIKE ON APRIL 1. ABUL GASSIM IN LENGTHY  
MEETING ATTENDED BY SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM GOVERNMENT,  
SSU, AND IMPORTANT UNIONS, ESTABLISHED BROAD COMMITTEE TO

STUDY WAGE AND CLASSIFICATION NEEDS, AND MEANWHILE ORDERED TECHNICIANS BACK TO WORK ON GROUNDS THAT STRIKES WERE ILLEGAL UNDER MAY REVOLUTION, UNIONS HAD NOT EXHAUSTED OTHER REMEDIES, AND SUDANGOV WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE WITH STRIKERS ANYWAY. END OF REPORTING PERIOD THUS FOUND SUDAN IN PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY AND LABOR UNREST, INCLUDING REPORTS OF POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST RAILROAD WORKERS IN ATBARA, IMMINENT ADDITIONAL STRIKES AND RUMORED CASES OF INDUSTRIAL SABOTAGE. LABOR STRIKE WAS MOST DRAMATIC MANIFESTATION OF WIDESPREAD, DEEPLY FELT CONCERN OVER DETERIORATING ECONOMIC SITUATION.

7. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, NIMEIRI'S SOLE AND STURDY POWER BASE, SPENT QUIET FIRST QUARTER DIGESTING ARRIVAL OF THREE C-130S FROM USA WITH THREE MORE DUE BEFORE JUNE, SENDING OFFICERS FOR TRAINING, AND CONTEMPLATING FUTURE ACQUISITION OF SQUADRON OF F-5S. SUDANESE TALKS WITH SAUDI ARABIA ON FINANCING THESE AND OTHER PURCHASES CONTINUED. SUDAN INDULGED IN WINDOWSHOPPING FOR OTHER ARMS, BASED MOSTLY ON NEEDS DISCUSSED IN U.S. SURVEY REPORT OF LAST AUGUST, BUT NO MAJOR COMMITMENTS WERE MADE. PURCHASE OF FRENCH MIRAGES REMAINED JUST RUMOR BUT HIGH LEVEL SOURCES ACCEPTED IT. REPORTS OF ANY DISSENSION WITH MILITARY RANKS WERE MUTED, ALTHOUGH IN FEB. TWO OFFICERS WERE HELD BRIEFLY FOR QUESTIONING ABOUT SUBVERSION AND THEN RELEASED. ON MARCH 14 AMBASSADOR GAVE WELL-RECEIVED LECTURE AT COMMAND AND STAFF SCHOOL TO AUDIENCE INCLUDING DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF. CONFIDENTIAL

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## II. FOREIGN RELATIONS

7. SUDAN SUCCEEDED IN REDUCING TENSION WITH LIBYA AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS HAVE BEEN RE-ESTABLISHED ALTHOUGH FORMALITIES ARE NOT COMPLETE. RAPPROCHEMENT WAS ACHIEVED WITHOUT HELP FROM EGYPT WHICH LOOKED ASKANCE AT SUDDEN FRIENDLINESS WITH QADDAFI. SUDAN IS MOTIVATED BY NEED TO OBTAIN RETURN FROM LIBYA OF 3,000 ARMED ANSAR, PARA-MILITARY BRANCH OF MAHDIST SECT WHO ARE SUBVERSION THREAT AS LONG AS THEY REMAIN ACROSS BORDER. SADIQ AL-MAHDI CLAIMED TO HAVE NEGOTIATED RETURN OF ANSAR IN EARLY 1978, BUT APPARENTLY QADDAFI IS WAITING UNTIL SUDAN-LIBYA RELATIONS ARE SUFFICIENTLY FRIENDLY BEFORE RELEASING ANSAR.

8. IN PURSUIT OF BETTER RELATIONS WITH LIBYA, AND WITH APPROVAL OF DESPERATE MALLOUM GOVERNMENT, VICE PRESIDENT ABUL GASSIM CHAIRED CONFERENCE AT SEBHA IN LIBYA OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM CHAD GOVERNMENT, PRO-LIBYAN REBELS, LIBYA, NIGER AND SUDAN. AGREEMENT REACHED MARCH 28 SEEMED ON FACE TO GIVE REBELS EVERYTHING QADDAFI WANTED THEM TO HAVE,

ALTHOUGH CHAD GOVERNMENT LATER FOUND DIFFERENT  
INTERPRETATION.

9. EGYPT WAS EXCLUDED FROM CHADIAN NEGOTIATIONS AND FROM  
SETTLEMENT. BETTER RELATIONS WITH LIBYA WAS CRITICIZED  
BY SOME IN KHARTOUM AS TILT AWAY FROM EGYPT, WITH FOREIGN  
MINISTER RASHID AL-TAHIR AS MOST IMPORTANT SPOKESMAN FOR  
PRO-EGYPTIAN FACTION IN SUDAN. EGYPT AND SUDAN CONTINUED  
TO PROFESS DESIRE FOR INTEGRATION OF NILE VALLEY COUNTRIES  
INSOFAR AS FEASIBLE, ESPECIALLY BORDER AREAS WHERE TWO  
COUNTRIES BLEND ADMINISTRATIVELY ALREADY. NIMEIRI  
REMAINED STEADFAST IN SUPPORT OF SADAT'S MIDDLE EAST  
POLICIES. RASHID AL-TAHIR HELPED ARRANGE ARAB LEAGUE  
UNITY COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY NIMEIRI TO RESOLVE QUARRELING  
WHICH AROSE AFTER START OF SADAT-BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS.  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 KHARTOUM 1564

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

10. ETHIOPIA REMAINED ELUSIVE, PAYING LIP SERVICE TO  
OAU MEDIATION COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS AND RE-OPENING AIR  
LINKS TO KHARTOUM, BUT RETAINING CONTROL OF SEVERAL  
THOUSAND ANSAR IN ETHIOPIA AND STONEWALLING SUDANESE  
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DEMANDS FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN ERITREA. SUDAN SUSPECTED  
MALICIOUS ROLE OF SOVIETS IN ETHIOPIAN INTRANSIGENCE  
BECAUSE OUSTER OF USSR FROM HORN IS PRINCIPAL SUDANESE  
OBJECTIVE. SUDAN ALSO IGNORED OAU MEDIATION RECOMMENDATIONS  
BY CONTINUING ANTI-ETHIOPIAN BROADCASTS BY ERITREA GROUPS,  
ALTHOUGH EXTENT OF BROADCASTS FLUCTUATED IN RESPONSE TO  
SUDANESE CONCERNS ABOUT ERITREAN GROUPS IN COUNTRY.  
PERSISTENT ATTEMPTS BY SUDAN TO UNIFY VARIOUS ERITREAN  
LIBERATION FRONTS, SPECIFICALLY ELF AND EPLF, CONTINUED  
TO MEET WITH FAILURE WHICH DID NOT DETER SUDANGOV FROM  
ANNOUNCING NEW AGREEMENTS. SUDAN AND ETHIOPIA AT MOMENT BOTH  
CLAIM TO BE WILLING TO COMPROMISE TO ACHIEVE BETTER RELATIONS  
BUT SUSPICIONS AND DOUBTS EXIST ON BOTH SIDES.

11. RASHID AL-TAHIR'S EFFORTS AT CAIRO AS PRESIDENT OF  
ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL FOCUSED ON POSSIBLE ARAB SUMMIT AT  
KHARTOUM BEFORE JULY. RASHID'S DIPLOMATIC ENDEAVORS  
WERE MATCHED BY ABUL GASSIM WHO HANDLED LIBYAN, CHAD  
AND, HE HOPES, ETHIOPIAN AFFAIRS. FOREIGN POLICY LEADER-  
SHIP RIVALRY WAS TOLERATED BY NIMEIRI, HOWEVER, SUDAN  
REMAINED MODERATE AND GENERALLY PRO-WESTERN ON MOST  
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, AND FOREIGN POLICY CONTINUED TO  
BE FUELED BY DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS. FOREMOST AMONG  
THESE DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS IS DEVELOPMENT, BUT  
NATIONAL UNITY AND SECURITY ARE MIXED IN. PEACEFUL  
SETTLEMENTS ARE PREFERRED. SUDAN'S "NICE GUY" STANCE ON  
MOST ISSUES IS BASED ALSO IN PART ON NIMEIRI'S DESIRE  
TO BE ACCEPTABLE AND USEFUL OAU PRESIDENT STARTING WITH  
SUMMIT MEETING IN KHARTOUM IN JULY.

III. U.S.- SUDAN RELATIONS

12. RELATIONS BETWEEN USG AND SUDANGOV CONTINUED CORDIAL  
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AND COOPERATIVE. NIMEIRI CONTINUED TO OFFER READY ACCESS TO AMBASSADOR UPON REQUEST AND IN ADDITION RECEIVED IMPORTANT VISITORS. NIMEIRI TOOK STRONG PERSONAL INTEREST IN SCHEDULING AND MEETING WITH LARGE GROUP OF AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN WHO VISITED SUDAN FOR SEVERAL DAYS IN LATE FEBRUARY AS MEMBERS SUDAN-AMERICAN BUSINESS COUNCIL. BOTH SIDES WERE FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY ATTITUDES AND INTERESTS OF OTHER. ARRIVAL OF FIRST THREE C-130S AND INCREASING CLOSE WORKING RELATIONS OCCASIONED BY COMPLEXITIES OF MILITARY SALES GAVE IMPRESSION OF GROWING UNDERSTANDING AND FRIENDLINESS. ALL SIDES WERE PLEASED THAT C-130S WERE PUT TO USE FERRYING DESPERATELY NEEDED FUEL AND GRAIN TO SOUTHERN REGION AND FOR OTHER DEVELOPMENT RELATED PURPOSES. ALTHOUGH SALE OF F-5ES PROGRESSING SMOOTHLY THROUGH BUREAUCRATIC PROCESS WITH LONG DISTANCE TO GO BEFORE ACTUAL ARRIVAL, U.S. ALREADY GETTING FAVORABLE CREDIT FOR EAGERLY AWAITED SQUADRON. SUDANESE HAVE RAISED POSSIBILITY OF OTHER ACQUISITIONS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM U.S. BUT SEEM TO ACCEPT OUR RELUCTANCE TO GO MUCH BEYOND F-5ES AND ASSOCIATED RADAR FOR THIS TYPE OF ASSISTANCE. MEANWHILE, FORWARD MOVEMENT IN AID PROGRAM CONTINUED WITH FIRST NEW PROGRAM IN FIELD, AT ABYEI, BEGUN DURING QUARTER. BERGUS

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## Message Attributes

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**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** POLITICAL SUMMARIES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 08 apr 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Document Unique ID:** 00  
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**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
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**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
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**Reference:** 78 KHARTOUM 298  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 18 apr 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 3030700  
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**TAGS:** PGOV, PINT, PEPR, EFIN, SU  
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**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014